Michigan Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 6

1955

Beaney: The Right to Counsel in American Courts
William M. Kunstler
New York Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Legal Profession
Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
William M. Kunstler, Beaney: The Right to Counsel in American Courts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 902 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss6/17

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

902

MrcmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

By William M. Beaney.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1955. Pp. 268. $4.50.
THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AMERICAN CotmTs.

The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, inter alia, that
an accused in a criminal proceeding "shall enjoy the right . • • to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." For almost a century and a half after
its ratification, this provision received only negative application, i.e., the federal
courts could not preclude a defendant in a criminal trial from retaining counsel
if he so desired. On the other hand, his voluntary failure to do so because of
financial or other considerations, raised no constitutional issue.
However, in 1938 the case of Johnson v. Zerbst1 reached the Supreme Court
where the issue as to whether the failure to appoint counsel was a jurisdictional
defect in the constitutional sense was directly posed. Despite a dearth of precedent, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, held that ''The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives
the assistance of counsel."2 That decision reflected a substantial broadening of
the concept of what constitutes a fair trial and serves as the bellwether of Dr.
William M. Beaney's detailed and intelligent study of a suddenly pertinent
constitutional safeguard.
The decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, like that in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
decided in the same year, was unexpected. Outside of some isolated dicta in
several cases involving mob-dominated trials,3 only Powell v. Alabama4 stood
between the Court and a total lack of precursory decisions. However, the compelling and eloquent language of Justice Sutherland in that case, obiter dicta
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
21a. at 463.
s See Holmes' dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582 (1915);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d)
586 (5th Cir. 1931).
1
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though much of it may be, did much to construct a suitable springboard for
the Johnson majority.
Powell 11. Alabama, popularly known as the Scottsboro case, involved the
trials, for rape, of nine Negro defendants, eight of whom were convicted in
four separate trials which occurred on the very day of arraignment. No attorney
answered or appeared for the defendants, except that a Tennessee attorney by
the name of Roddy volunteered to assist court-appointed counsel. After some
desultory attempts by the trial court to enlist the entire local bar on behalf of
the defendants, all of whom were illiterate and youthful, an aging, half-hearted
Scottsboro attorney volunteered to help Roddy. Appeals to the Alabama
Supreme Court were denied in seven of the convictions, the exception being
that of a thirteen-year-old defendant.
The United States Supreme Court sustained the appellants' contention that
there had been a denial of due process because "in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making
his own defense because of ignorance •.. , illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law, and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."5
Sutherland's definition of "ignorance"6 was so broad that it in effect placed
every layman in the category of the Scottsboro defendants. Dr. Beaney, with
the omniscience of hindsight, is quick to recognize the sweeping implications
of Sutherland's gratuitous remarks about the plight of unaided defendants in
criminal cases. Such implications were, however, not perceived by many of the
contemporary writers. 7
Six years later Johnson v. Zerbst reached the Court. This case had its origin
in November of 1934 when two Marines were arrested in South Carolina and
charged with uttering counterfeit notes. With the exception of an attorney
who represented them at their preliminary hearing before a United States
Commissioner, they were without counsel for all subsequent proceedings. Two
days after their indictment, the defendants were tried, convicted and sentenced
to four and one-half years in jail. Several months later, they petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, 8 basing their contention on the fact that they had neither
been offered counsel by the trial court nor been advised that they were entitled
to a court appointment. Furthermore, they claimed that they had asked the
United States attorney to obtain counsel for them but that he had refused on
the ground that such a practice did not prevail in South Carolina in noncapital cases. In denying their application, the district court held that despite
~ 287
11 1d.

U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).

at 71.
6Jd. at 69.
7 18 lowA L. lli!v. 383 (1933); 21 CALIF. L. lli!v. 484 (1933).
s Bridwell v. Aderhold, (D.C. Ga. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 253.
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the fact that petitioners had been "deprived of their constitutional rights," 9 it
was compelled to reach an adverse decision solely because they had chosen an
improper remedy.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court, but
insisted that its obiter dictum with reference to the duty of the trial court to
provide counsel in every federal criminal proceeding whether requested or not
was unsupported decisionally. 10 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
'The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
he has or waives the assistance of counsel."11
Thus, without having to overturn a substantial body of decisional law, the
Court was able to raise the right to counsel in federal courts to a level which
it had never even remotely attained since the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
Black went even further and suggested that the trial record would have
to contain evidence of a positive character with reference to waiver in order
to meet the requirements of the new rule he was enunciating. He did not
attempt to particularize the nature of this evidence, but in a later case the
Court held that a plea of guilty by a defendant who had not been informed
of his right to counsel was not tantamount to waiver. 12 Further conjecture,
however, became academic in view of rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, enacted in 1946 as a direct result of Johnson 11. Zerbst13 which
requires that defendants be advised by the court of their right to counsel and
that they must be supplied with legal assistance if they are indigent unless
they elect otherwise.
On the state level, the problem still remains acute in view of the inapplicability of the Sixth Amendment to state court proceedings. 14 All states provide
counsel for poor defendants in capital cases but very few do so in less serious
proceedings, and those that do insist upon an express request by the accused.
It is here that Dr. Beaney is obviously most concerned and he does an extremely
competent job in tracing the impact and effect of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in this area. In this con~ection, he makes reference again to Powell 11. Alabama whose reasoning, he feels, should have been
immediately extended to include all criminal proceedings, not merely those
involving capital crimes.
That it was not is a source of keen disappointment to him. The Supreme
Court has refused to apply Sutherland's standard in all noncapital cases unless

9Jd at 255.
v. Zerbst, (5th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 748 at 751.
11 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 at 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
12Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574 (1941).
13 Walker v. Johnston, supra note 12, and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62
S.Ct. 457 (1942) were also influential.
14 See Massey v. Moore, (5th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 665.
10 Johnson
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the record indicated other prejudicial circumstances such as the extreme youthfulness of the defendant15 or material judicial errors.16 As Justice Roberts put
it in Betts 11. Brady,17 a robbery case which reached the Court in 1942, it was
only "in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements" that a
denial of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights was also a denial of due
process.18 Therefore, the refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel as requested
by Betts had to be "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given
case."19 Accordingly, the Court held that the constitutional rights of a literate
and intelligent defendant had not been violated by the lower court's action.
Most of Dr. Beaney's treatise is written with scholarly detachment and he
strives to maintain objectivity. However, his sensibilities are apparent throughout and, in his concluding chapter, he cannot withhold his disapproval of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to proceed to what he considers the logical limits of
the Powell case, namely to require that counsel be available to indigent defendants in any state criminal proceeding unless there is a positive waiver of this
right. It does seem that a state defendant should not be in a worse position than
his federal prototype and it is not difficult to agree in spirit with Dr. Beaney's
thesis that anything less than the Johnson 11. Zerbst standard is a denial of due
process. However, the cases are against him and there is no indication of any
significant change in the offing.20
Although he expends very few pages on the methods of selecting counsel,
Dr. Beaney is convinced that, with rare exceptions, an indigent defendant has
to be content with young and inexperienced counsel in all but those capital
cases where the publicity is enough to attract leading members of the bar. He
feels that it is too early to determine whether the legal aid societies which have
proved so effective in New York City and Philadelphia, or the California public
defender plan will furnish a universal solution to the problem. Perhaps the
New Jersey system which provides for the rotation of attorneys from local bar
association rosters is the right answer. The author does not advocate one method
over another but he does suggest that immediate and extensive consideration of
the entire situation is urgently needed. Even if the Supreme Court does not
hold that every indigent defendant facing trial in a state court must, in the

15 See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
16 See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948) (facetious remarks
during sentencing); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256 (1948) (misinterpretation of Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act).
11316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
1s Id. at 462-463.
19 Id. at 462.
2 0See Bute v. lliinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763 (1948); Quicksall v. Michigan,
339 U.S. 660, 70 S.Ct. 910 (1950); Baker v. Jamison, 72 S.D. 638, 38 N.W. (2d) 441
(1949); Ex Parte Johnson, 153 Tex. Cr. 619, 224 S.W. (2d) 240 (1949); Robinson v.
Smyth, 190 Va. 724, 58 S.E.. (2d) 4 (1950).
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absence of an express waiver, be provided with counsel, it should insist that
those entitled to representation be assigned competent and interested attorneys.

William M. Kunstler,
Associate Professor of Law,
New York Law School

